National Advertising Company v. Murray City Corporation, Gene V. Crawford, Sherry T. Crawford : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
National Advertising Company v. Murray City
Corporation, Gene V. Crawford, Sherry T.
Crawford : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steve K. Gordon; Durham Jones and Pinegar; Attorney for Appellant.
Donald L. Dalton; Dalton and Kelley; Attorney for Appellee.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, National Advertising Company v. Murray City Corporation, No. 20050110 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5567
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Case No. 20050110-CA 
Priority No. 15 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, 
GENE V. CRAWFORD, SHERRY T. 
CRAWFORD dba "Val-Dev, L.L.C.," 
Defendants/Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Presiding 
Steven K. Gordon (5958) 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 
Donald L. Dalton (4305) 
DALTON & KELLEY 
Post Office Box 58084 
Salt Lake City UT 84158 
Telephone: (801)583-2510 
Attorneys for Gene V. Crawford and Attorneys for National 
Sherry T. Crawford Advertising Company 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
OCT 0 7 2005 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NATIONAL ADVERTISING Case No. 20050110-CA 
COMPANY, : 
Priority No. 15 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
MURRAY CITY CORPORATION, : 
GENE V. CRAWFORD, SHERRY T. 
CRAWFORD dba "Val-Dev, L.L.C.," : 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
On Appeal from Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Presiding 
Steven K. Gordon (5958) Donald L. Dalton (4305) 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR DALTON & KELLEY 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 Post Office Box 5 8084 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City UT 84158 
Telephone: (801)415-3000 Telephone: (801)583-2510 
Attorneys for Gene V. Crawford and Attorneys for National 
Sherry T. Crawford Advertising Company 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENTS 1 
I. THE CRAWFORDS' COUNTERCLAIM IS NOT SAVED BY 
URCP 13(d) 1 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION WAS STRICTLY 
LIMITED BY THE ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT 3 
III.THE CRAWFORDS'MOTION WAS UNTIMELY 6 
CONCLUSION 7 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81 5 
R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, 936 P.d 1068 (Utah 1997) 5 
The Tool Box, Inc. v. Ogden City, 419 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 2005) 3-4, 
6 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) 7 
Rules 
URCP 13(d) 
URCP 13(e) 
URCP 15(a) 
URCP 15(c) 
URCP 59(e) 
URCP 60(b) 
FRCP 15(a) 
FRCP 59(e) 
FRCP 60(b) 
3 
5 
4 
7 
3-7 
3-7 
3,4 
4 
4,6 
ii 
Treatises 
6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Civil 2d 4 
iii 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE CRAWFORDS' COUNTERCLAIM IS NOT SAVED BY URCP 
13(d). 
The Crawfords have made various excuses for their failure to file a 
counterclaim until after the end of the case. None of them is plausible. The first is 
that the counterclaim did not "mature" until after this Court ruled on the validity of 
the parties' sign permits. However, it is easy to see that the validity of the sign 
permits had nothing to do with the Crawfords' breach of contract claim. 
The Crawfords' counterclaim was based on breach of the Lease, 
specifically, %9. Validity of the sign permit was not an element of the claim. This 
can be seen from the express terms of f9: 
In the event that the portion of the Lessor's property occupied by the 
Lessee's displays is to be improved by permanent construction or 
remodeling, as evidenced by a building permit, requiring the removal 
of the Lessee's displays, the Lessor may terminate this lease upon 
giving the L essee ninety (90) days written notice of termination,.... 
The Lessee agrees to remove its displays within the 90 day period. 
The Crawfords' claim for damages is based on the fact that NAC did not 
remove its sign from the Crawfords' property in response to the early termination 
notice.1 This is evident from statements made by the Crawfords in this case: 
1
 The sign was removed at the end of the normal Lease term. 
National had to remove its sign by October 23, 1996. The evidence 
presented at trial established that if National had done so, the 
Crawfords could have erected their own sign and collected lease 
payments beginning in November of 1996, which they were ready, 
willing and able to do. 
Pg. 17, Appellees' Brief 
It is obvious that the Crawfords needed a sign permit to erect a sign and 
collect the lease payments, but this was no part of their claim against NAC. The 
Crawfords never claimed that NAC breached a duty to them by applying for a sign 
permit of its own even though this prevented them from getting their sign permit. 
It was with good reason this Court said that questions concerning f 9 of the 
Lease were "ultimately irrelevant to our decision." (Memorandum Decision, Case 
No. 20020717-CA) 
Even if the validity of the sign permit were a "prerequisite" to the 
Crawfords' claim (pg. 12, Appellees' Brief), it is clear that the Crawfords were 
possessed of such a permit back on March 29, 1996. (R. 936, f 12) 
From the day the Crawfords entered the case, it has been their claim that 
theirs was the only valid sign permit. It was not necessary for this Court to rule on 
this issue before the Crawfords could assert their claim. Otherwise, parties would 
be required to separately litigate each and every element of their claim to a 
2 
successful conclusion before asserting a claim. Civil litigation would grind to a 
halt under such a precedent. 
There can be no question that the Crawfords' counterclaim was "mature" on 
or before October 23, 1996. Therefore, the counterclaim was impermissible under 
URCP 13(d). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION WAS STRICTLY LIMITED 
BY THE ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT. 
The gist oPthe Crawfords' argument is that no matter whether their 
counterclaim was mature, the trial court had discretion to allow its late filing. A 
recent decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals confirms this position, but 
makes it clear that in a case like this, the trial court's discretion is strictly limited 
by the provisions of URCP 60(b) and 59(e). 
In The Tool Box, Inc. v. Ogden City Corp., 419 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 2005), 
plaintiff waited until after final judgment and affirmation on appeal before moving 
for leave to amend its complaint. Plaintiff made the same argument as the 
Crawfords in this case (pp. 10-11): "[TJhat leave to amend should be freely 
allowed under Rule 15(a) when justice requires,...." 419 F.3d at 1087 
However, the liberal amendment policy of URCP 15(a) does not apply to 
motions for leave brought after entry of final judgment: "[0]nce judgment is 
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entered, the filing of an amended complaint is not permissible until judgment is set 
aside or vacated pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) or 60(b)." 419 F.3d at 1087 
(quotations and citations omitted) 
The court quoted from Wright & Miller as follows: 
To hold otherwise would enable the liberal amendment policy of Rule 
15(a) to be employed in a way that is contrary to the philosophy 
favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of 
litigation. The fact that a party desiring to amend after judgment has 
been entered is obliged first to obtain relief from the judgment 
imposes some important restrictions on the ability to employ Rule 
15(a).. ..For example, a judgment generally will be set aside only to 
accommodate some new matter that could not have been asserted 
during the trial, which means that relief will not be available in many 
instances in which leave to amend would be granted in the 
prejudgment situation. Furthermore, unlike the liberal amendment 
policy of Rule 15(a), a party moving under Rule 60(b) will be 
successful only if he first demonstrates that the judgment should be 
set aside for one of the six reasons specified in the rule. 
419 F.3d at 1087 (quoting 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 2d § 1489, at 694) 
The Crawfords seem to recognize the applicability of URCP 60(b) and 
59(e). On pg. 9 of their brief, the Crawfords claim as excuses for their late filing 
"(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect in discovering the new 
claims for damages; and/or (2) newly discovered evidence, which are grounds for 
reopening the judgment under Rules 59 and/or 60." (Pg. 9, n.l, Brief of Appellees) 
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However, the Crawfords never claimed "newly discovered evidence" until 
now, and their Motion for Leave filed in the district court was no more specific 
about "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" than their appellate 
brief in this case. (RR. 814-20) The district court never should have entertained 
the Crawfords' Motion without a statement of the specific grounds for relief under 
URCP 60(b) or 59(e). 
No matter whether the Motion was filed under URCP 13(e), 59(e) or 60(b), 
there was no basis for relief. The Crawfords quibble about their son's "subjective 
belief in the ripeness of their counterclaim, (pg. 12, Appellees' Brief) but there is 
no question that they knew such a claim existed back on August 7, 1996. It is 
impossible to imagine how the Crawfords claim "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect" under the circumstances of this case. 
The Crawfords contend that abuse of discretion cannot be shown without 
prejudice to the opposing party. E.g., Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, {^38; R&R 
Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, 936 P.2d 1068, 1080 (Utah 1997) The 
Crawfords proceed to question whether NAC can make that showing. (Pg. 11, 
Appellee's Brief) 
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The prejudice should be obvious: A money judgment for $109,632.91 has 
been entered against NAC. Except for the late filing of the Crawfords' 
counterclaim, NAC would not be the subject of this judgment. 
III. THE CRAWFORDS' MOTION WAS UNTIMELY. 
This says nothing about the timeliness of the Crawford's Motion under 
URCP 60(b) or 59(e). This was also addressed in Tool Box. 
Like the Crawfords (pg. 10, Appellees' Brief), The Tool Box claimed that 
the judgment was not final until after the ruling by the appellate court. 419 F.3d at 
1088 However, "Tool Box is again mistaken:.. .[A]n appeal does not toll or extend 
the one-year time limit of Rule 60(b)." Id. As a result: "The district court 
correctly denied Tool Box's Rule 60(b)(1) motion...as untimely, and, thus, 
correctly denied the motion to amend the complaint." Id. at 1089 
The Crawfords' position on finality of judgments would turn appellate 
procedure on its head. The time for filing a motion under URCP 60(b) and 59(e) 
started to run from the date that Judgment was entered in the trial court (August 2, 
2002). Even if the Court wishes to excuse the fact that the Crawfords never made 
such a motion, the time for filing such a motion ran on November 4, 2002 (in the 
case of URCP 60(b)) and August 16, 2002 (in the case of URCP 59(e)). 
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The Crawfords contend that they could have filed an independent action (pg. 
14, Appellees' Brief), and this is true, but they never did, and it was too late by the 
time they finally moved to amend their Answer. UCA § 78-12-23(2) 
The "relation back" principle of URCP 15(c) was the only way to save their 
counterclaim, and this is why the Crawfords had to move for leave in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The clock started to run on the Crawfords' counterclaim on October 23, 
1996 (at the latest). The Crawfords waited until after final judgment (six years 
later) before raising it. When they did, it was past the time for motions under 
URCP 59(e) or 60(b). If their Motion for Leave is to be interpreted as a motion 
under URCP 59(e) or 60(b), they have not stated any grounds. If the district court 
had discretion to entertain the Crawfords' Motion for Leave, that discretion was 
abused when the Motion was granted. 
For the foregoing, additional reasons, judgment for the Crawfords (R. 934) 
should be REVERSED. 
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DATED this 7 day of October, 2005. 
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